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In re Estate of Horst Revocable Tr., 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 90 (Dec. 31, 2020)1 
 




 Under NRS 164.021(2)(c), a trustee’s notice to beneficiaries is required to include “[a]ny 
provision of the trust instrument which pertains to the beneficiary.” Patricia Horst, a trustee to 
her grandmother Ella E. Horst’s Trust, served notice to beneficiaries, heirs, and interested 
persons regarding the Trust’s irrevocability. At the time she issued notice, the Trust contained 
three amendments. No beneficiaries objected within the allotted 120-day period. When Patricia 
later sought to recognize a purported fourth amendment, Brian Holiday, Ella E. Horst’s son, filed 
an objection to all the Trust’s amendments. Patricia argued that Holiday was time-barred from 
objecting to the second and third amendments. Holiday disagreed and contended that the word 
“any” in the statute was properly interpreted to mean “all.” The Court found that based on the 
principles of statutory construction, the word “any” in NRS 164.021(2)(c) means “all.” Thus, 
Holiday was not time-barred from objecting to the second and third amendments of the Trust 




 The Trust’s settlor, Ella E. Horst, established the Trust to benefit her children and 
grandchildren. The trust originally provided a specific gift to one of her grandchildren, Patricia, 
with the remainder divided amongst Ella’s two grandchildren. Ella executed the first amendment 
of the Trust to reflect the death of her daughter and add specific gifts to her son, Brian Holiday. 
 Ella eventually bought a home with Patricia and Patricia’s partner, with the Trust paying 
50 percent of the purchase price in cash and retaining a 50-percent interest in the home. Ella 
executed the second amendment to the Trust a few years later, annulling Patricia’s initial 
specified gift, providing her with a specific gift of the Trust’s interest in the home, and naming 
Patricia successor trustee. The following year, Ella executed the third amendment to the Trust, 
which provided an additional gift of real property to Patricia. Patricia’s partner later conveyed 
her 25-percent interest in the home to the Trust. It was at that point that Ella purportedly 
executed the fourth amendment to the Trust, where she added a specific gift of the Trust’s 
recently acquired 25-percent interest in the home to Patricia. 
 Upon Ella’s death, the Trust became irrevocable and Patricia accepted her appointment as 
successor trustee. She then served notice to beneficiaries, heirs, and interested persons regarding 
the Trust’s irrevocability, as required by NRS 164.021(1). The notice included the full text of the 
original Trust and the first three amendments but did not include the purported fourth 
amendment. None of residuary beneficiaries timely objected to the notice. 
 Over a year later, Patricia petitioned the district court to confirm the purported fourth 
amendment as a valid amendment to the Trust. That same month she sent a notice to all Trust 
beneficiaries. Two months later, Holiday filed an objection, arguing that the purported fourth 
amendment was not valid and that the second and third amendments were the product of undue 
influence. The district court concluded that NRS 164.021(4) barred Holiday’s objection to the 
second and third amendments because he filed it more than 120 days after Patricia served the 
 
1  By Ashley Schobert. 
initial notice of the Trust’s irrevocability, in which she included the first three amendments. The 
district court, however, permitted Holiday’s objection to the purported fourth amendment. 




 The question presented to the Court was what a trustee must include in a notice to 
beneficiaries under NRS 164.021 to trigger the 120-day limitation period for challenging the 
validity of a trust. The Court specifically considered whether Patricia’s initial notice to the 
beneficiaries complied with NRS 164.021(2)(c), thereby triggering the 120-day limitation under 
NRS 164.021(4) and precluding Holiday’s challenge to the second and third amendments to the 
Trust. 
 In order to answer this question, the Court employed a statutory interpretation analysis. 
The Court explained that the language of a statute is considered ambiguous if the plain language 
is “subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.”2 Once the Court determines that a statute 
is in fact ambiguous, it may consider “reason and public policy” to discern the Legislature’s 
intent.3 The Court concluded that NRS 164.021(2)(c) is ambiguous, so employed a full statutory 
interpretation evaluation. 
 Under NRS 164.021(4), a beneficiary has 120 days from service of notice to contest the 
validity of the trust. Additionally, NRS 164.021(2)(c) requires the notice to include “[a]ny 
provision of the trust instrument” that pertains to a beneficiary. Here, the parties disputed the 
meaning of the word “any.” Holiday argued that “any” equated to “all,” and that Patricia’s initial 
notice did not trigger the 120-day limitation period because it did not include the purported 
fourth amendment, which is a trust provision pertaining to him. 
 Patricia, on the other hand, contended that the statute instead used discretionary terms, 
noting that the trustee “may” provide notice, and by using the term “any,” the Legislature 
intended to give a trustee discretion in selecting which provisions to include in the notice. 
Patricia furthered argued that NRS 164.021 was voluntary and optional, rather than a mandatory 
notice statute. Accordingly, Patricia argued that Holiday’s challenge to the second and third 
amendments to the Trust were time-barred because Holiday objected more than 120 days after 
the initial notice. 
 The Court first looked to the plain meaning of the word “any,” and determined the 
Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary contemplated both parties’ proffered definitions of 
“any.” The Court reasoned that because both parties’ proffered constructions were plausible, the 
word “any” in NRS 164.021(2)(c) is ambiguous.4 
Because the plain meaning rendered the term “any” ambiguous, the Court next turned to 
an analysis of the legislative history. The Court began by noting that courts generally ascribe the 
same meaning to “[i]dentical words used in different parts of the same… statute.”5 The Court 
found that the Legislature used the term “any” multiple times throughout NRS 164.021(2), 
specifically in subsections (b), (c), and (d). Accordingly, the Court held that the Legislature 
intended “any” to have the same meaning throughout the entirety of NRS 164.021(2). 
 
2  In re Estate of Black, 132 Nev. 73, 75 367 P.3d 416, 417 (2016). 
3  In re Contrevo, 123 Nev. 20, 23, 153 P.3d 652, 653–54 (2007). 
4  Id.; cf. Casteneda v. State, 132 Nev. 434, 438, 373 P.3d 108, 111 (2016). 
5  3A Shambie Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 67:2 (8th ed. 2019 update). 
Under NRS 164.021(2)(d), a trustee’s notice to beneficiaries must include “[a]ny 
information required to be included in the notice expressly provided by the trust instrument.” 
The Court found that under this subsection, the trustee has no discretion to determine what to 
include and what to omit. Instead, the trustee must comply with the terms of the trust instrument 
and send all the required information. The Court found that, because “any” meant “all” in this 
subsection, the rules of statutory construction require construing the term “any” in NRS 
164.021(2)(c) to mean “all.” 
The Court also found that in procedural statutes, “any” typically is interpreted to mean 
“any and all.”6 Additionally, the term “any” under NRS 164.021(2)(c) modifies a singular noun 
and is used in an affirmative context. This approach, the Court concluded, indicates that the 
Legislature intended the term “any” to mean “all.” 
The Court also undertook an examination of the legislative history and determined that it 
supported construing the term “any” to mean “all.” The Court specifically analyzed testimony 
before the legislature by Mr. Matthew Gray with the Trust and Estate Section. In his testimony, 
Mr. Gray emphasized that the bill was aimed at “expedit[ing] the process of [] trust 
administration.”7 He further noted that the statute was aimed at modernizing Nevada’s trust and 
estate law by making it more efficient and user-friendly.8 Another member of the Trust and 
Estate Section, Mr. Layne Rushforth, also testified that under the statute, there would be 120 
days to file a contest and the whole purpose of this is “to not have trust contests arise after the 
fact.”9 
Based on the legislative history, the Court found that Patricia was correct that the trustee 
has the discretion whether to send notice to beneficiaries in order to trigger the 120-day 
limitation period and cut off all challenges to the trust. But, the Court held, her contention that 
NRS 164.021’s legislative history suggests a trustee also has the discretion to confirm trust 
instruments in a piecemeal fashion is incorrect. This interpretation, the Court found, would not 
promote the Legislature’s desire for efficiency because it could allow for multiple contests to 
various trust provisions. The Court further held that Patricia’s proffered construction would not 
promote judicial economy and could increase the costs of trust administration due to successive 
contests. The Court found that Holiday’s proffered construction, on the other hand, is consistent 
with the Legislature’s intent because it requires a trustee to include every trust provision that 
pertains to a beneficiary within the notice. This interpretation, in turn, facilitates a single 
deadline for trust contests, as the beneficiaries will have all the information they need to review 
the terms of the trust and decide whether they wish to litigate. Thus, the Court found, the term 
“any” in NRS 164.021(2)(c) must mean “all” in order to be consistent with the rules of statutory 
construction. 
After concluding that “any” means “all,” the Court then turned to whether NRS 
164.021(2)(c) requires strict or substantial compliance. The Court noted that “time and manner” 
requirements are strictly construed, whereas substantial compliance may be sufficient for “form 
and content” requirements.10 To determine whether substantial compliance was sufficient for 
NRS 162.041(2)(c), the Court examined whether the purpose of the statute could adequately be 
 
6  Id. 
7  Hearing on S.B. 287 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 75th Leg. (Nev., Mar. 24, 2009). 
8  Id. 
9  Id. 
10  Leven v. Frey, 123 Nev. 399, 408, 168 P.3d 712, 718. (2007). 
served in a manner other than by technical compliance with the statutory language.11 The Court 
found that the statute uses mandatory language to describe the obligation of a trustee when he or 
she provides notice to beneficiaries. Thus, NRS 164.021(2)(c) requires strict compliance, 
because only a complete disclosure of all provisions of a trust instrument pertaining to a 
beneficiary will further the Legislature’s goals and give a beneficiary all the information she 
needs to decide whether to contest a trust. 
Based on these findings, the Court found that Holiday’s challenge to the second and third 
amendments was timely. Patricia’s initial notice did not include the purported fourth amendment 
to the Trust, and therefore did not trigger the 120-day limitation period. Because Holiday filed 
his objection to the second and third amendments within this limitation period, the district court 




The Court held that the term “any” in the language of NRS 164.021(2)(c) means “all.” 
Because the statute’s goals of adequately informing beneficiaries can only be accomplished by 
disclosure of all pertinent trust provisions, the Court also found that NRS 164.021(2)(c) is 
subject to strict compliance. 
Thus, by failing to include the purported fourth amendment to the Trust in her initial 
disclosure to beneficiaries, Patricia did not strictly comply with NRS 164.021(2)(c). Her initial 
disclosure, therefore, did not trigger the 120-day deadline for challenging the validity of the trust. 
Consequently, Holiday’s challenge to the second and third amendments to the Trust—which was 
filed within 120 days of complete disclosure—was timely. 
Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court’s order that concluded that Holiday was 
time-barred from challenging the second and third amendments to the Trust and remanded the 
case for proceedings consistent with the Court’s holding. 
 
 
11  Leyva v. Nat’l Default Servicing Corp., 127 Nev. 470, 476, 255 P.3d 1275, 1278 (2011). 
